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Determinants of the Timing

of Social Policy Adoption
CHULsoo KiM
SunMoon University, Korea
Department of Social Welfare

This study presents a macro-sociologicalanalysis of welfare state development, particularlyfocusing on the timing of adoption of social legislation,
by examining the dynamic relations between the historical constellation
of social and political forces and the rationalitiesof three key social actors
in the development of social policy. After a critical analysis of current
theories, the variablesare tested concerning the effects of different historical
sequencing and the accompanying bargainingpower of the social actors
on the timing of social policy adoption in the western European countries
from 1871 to 1976 using event-history analysis. Such variables as the
level of industrialization,the interests of state managers, the percentage
of the vote which socialist or labor parties received, and the timing of
political institutionalization should be considered crucial to explain the
development of social policy in these countries.
Since Germany adopted a work injuries program as its first
social insurance program in 1871, almost every country has introduced at least one of these five social policy programs: work
injuries, health, pension, family allowance, and unemployment
(Flora, Alber, Kohl, Kraus, Pfenning, & Seebohm, 1983; USDHHS,
1988). There are, however, many variations across the countries
in the timing of the adoption of social policy. Some countries have
adopted all five programs earlier, while others have introduced
only a few programs later (ILO, 1988).
During the last two decades many have attempted to investigate these variations, but research findings are often contradictory. Different authors emphasize the strength of different
variables, ranging from impacts of industrialization, to political
development, to structure of the state. Thus, the study reported
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here will examine the relative strength of these variables and their
interactive effects in terms of historical sequences of industrialization and political development, by considering the bargaining
powers of social actors-largely those of state managers, capitalists, and the working class in specific structural conditions.
Purpose and Literature Review
Formulation of social policy is regarded as one of the important characteristics of industrial society expanding along with
the process of industrialization and political development. This
study will try to answer the question of how economic, political
and class structures, and the bargaining powers of social actors
within them, affect the timing of the adoption of the types of
five social security programs: old age, invalidity, and survivor
(hereafter pension); sickness and maternity (health); work injury;
unemployment; and family allowance.
The main scope of this study is to analyze the origin and development of social policy in twelve western European countries:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.
There are three theoretical perspectives that try to explain the
development of social policy and the welfare state, focusing on
"economic examinations," "democratic politics," and "the role
of state" (Amenta & Carruthers, 1988, p. 664; Esping-Andersen,
1990; Quadagno, 1987; Williamson, 1987).
The economic examinations perspective considers the influence of structural economic changes as the determinants of welfare state and social policy. The logic-of-industrialism model, one
type of this perspective, argues that socioeconomic development,
technological growth, occupational system, and demographic
changes resulting from industrialization create social problems
and new social needs that must be solved by governments. At the
same time, economic growth and its bureaucratic outcomes make
it possible for the state to respond to these problems and new
needs (Cowgill, 1980; Form, 1979; Jackman, 1975; Kerr, Dunlop,
Harbison, & Myers, 1964; Lerner, 1958; Pampel & Weiss, 1983;
Wilensky, 1975; Wilensky & Lebeaux, 1965). Thus, according to
this theory, the higher the level of industrialization and the greater
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the size of the aged population, the sooner states develop social
programs and the higher the level of spending on them.
Many studies, however, do not support this hypothesis. They
conclude that social problems and new needs are not automatically translated into social policy except through some mechanism (Hage & Hanneman, 1980; Williamson &Weiss, 1979; Collier
& Messick, 1975). Furthermore, among the Third World countries
in general, and "late industrializing countries" in particular, including Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, Turkey, India, and Mexico, social
spending on social policy programs does not increase in response
to their economic growth of the countries.1
The theories of democratic politics insist that political activity has the most important influence on social policy spending.
This perspective includes two distinctive hypotheses: the "simple
democratic hypothesis" and the "social democratic hypothesis"
(Hewitt, 1977; Williamson, 1987). In the former, the degree of political democracy by itself is most important. The political competition perspective included in the former hypothesizes that political
candidates must consider their voters' policy demand so that
"the closer the electoral totals, the sooner the adoption of social
programs, the more generous the spending on them" (Amenta
& Carruthers, 1988, p. 665). However, this simple democratic
hypothesis has not been supported by most studies on American
states (Tucker & Herzik, 1986).
On the other hand, in the social democratic hypothesis, the
growth of the welfare state is a product of the increase of working
class bargaining power (Korpi, 1983) and the role of labor parties
supported by the growing strength of labor (Stephens, 1979) resulting from industrialization. Even though this perspective is
supported by numerous studies on advanced capitalist societies
(Stephens, 1979; Korpi, 1978, 1980; Cameron, 1978), it cannot explain the developments of social policy and welfare state in nondemocratic and non-capitalist societies (Flora & Heidenheimer,
1981).
The final perspective emphasizes the role of the state in developing welfare state and social policy. According to Skocpol
(1979), the state is "an autonomous structure-a structure with
a logic and interests of its own not necessarily equivalent to, or
fused with, the interests of the dominant class in society or the full

8

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare

set of member groups in the polity" (p. 27). Thus, social policies
are shaped by the structure, character, and historical experiences
of the state itself (Skocpol, 1980). The major criticism of the statecentered approach is that it ignores the class nature of the state
(Carnoy, 1984), and it overemphasizes one aspect of the stateautonomous structure. According to O'Connor (1973), the capitalist state also has two more functions, which are accumulation
and legitimitization. As he says, "the state must try to maintain
or create the conditions in which profitable capital accumulation
is possible. However, the state also must try to maintain or create
the conditions for social harmony" (p. 6). Thus, to fulfill these
two functions, the capitalist state cannot disregard the influence
of both labor and capital on social policy, unless, of2course, capital
accumulation projects become self-legitimatizing.
As reviewed above and shown in Figure 1, the three categories of social policy theories emphasize only one aspect of
determinants-either "supply side" (economic examinations perspective) or "demand side" (theories of democratic politics and
working-class-strength theory). Though state-centered theory
emphasizes both structural conditions and social actors, it stresses
state managers too much. In other words, these theories emphasize either social structure (e.g., the logic-of-industrialism,
the state-centered approach) or actors (e.g., labor-union strength
theory).
Given the importance of incorporating agency and its microfoundations, as well as structural conditions, to overcome the
reductionist perspectives in theories of the adoption of social policy, the present study tries to answer the following more specific
questions:
1. Did industrialization have an important influence on the development of the welfare state in western European countries?
a. If so, how did industrialization affect the bargaining power
of social actors?
b. If so, why did the U.K. adopt social insurance programs
relatively later than Germany, Denmark, or Austria?
2. Was political development an effective force for developing
social policy in these countries?
a. What were the different effects of limited and extended
suffrage on the development of social policy?
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Figure 1
Causal Structure of Theories of the Welfare State
D

ECONOMIC OR
POLITICAL
STRUCTURES

. DEVELOPMENT OF
THE WELFARE STATE

C

A
B
ACTORS

-

SOCIAL ACTORS
(i.e., capitalist, working
class or state managers)

D: logic of industrialism, simple democratic model,
"structuralist" Marxist
C: state-centered theory (Heclo)
E- * C: "Instrumentalist" Marxist, state-centered theory
(Skocpol), working-class-strength (Korpi, Shalev)
3
A-+C: working-class-strength (Stephens)

3. Were there different effects on the development of the welfare
state due to different sequences of industrialization and political development in these countries?
Methodologically, this study will try to overcome the linear
perspective existing in most social policy studies. These studies,
largely using linear regression models for cross-sectional analysis,
assume that social change has occurred in a linear direction so
that they cannot consider the interactive effect among variables.
Instead, this study assumes that social policy adoption is a historical event, and that the impacts of industrialization and political
development affect it differently depending upon the timing of
industrialization vis a vis political development.
Method and Data Measures
To assess the interactional impacts of industrialization and political development on the introduction of social policy, this study
uses event history analysis. Rejecting the prevalent assumptions
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of uni-linear impacts of industrialization or political development
in this area, this study assumes that political development, especially limited or universal suffrage, has had different impacts
depending upon different levels of industrialization.
Given the assumption, that is, the possibility of an individual
event, in this case social policy adoption, the possibility changes
depending on the level of industrialization and political development. We can assume that no event occurs in one state at time
tj and all possible events occur in another state at time tj+i with
change rate ri. One of the powerful statistical techniques for examining the continuous change process such as the level of industrialization and political development with discrete events like
social policy adoption is event-history analysis (Tuma & Hannan,
1984; Allison, 1984; Blossfeld et al., 1989; Aitkin et al., 1989). If we
suppose that in a certain state at time ti, no social policy program
is adopted in any countries, and in a state at time tj+i, all possible
social policy programs have been adopted in all countries, we can
calculate the adoption rate ri as follows:
h(t) =lim P(t, t + s)/s
s ---* 0

where h(t)

: hazard rate (adoption rate)

P(t; t + s): probability of policy adoption

in the interval from t to t + s
To choose a proper model among alternative non-parametric
and parametric models within the event-history-analysis framework, we have to consider several things (Allison, 1984, 1991;
Blossfeld et al., 1989): (a) whether discrete time method or continuous time method is appropriate for the data, (b) whether
the hazard rate depends on time, (c) whether there is a strong
hypothesis on the shape of the hazard and the survival functions
to choose between non-parametric and parametric models, and
(d) the number of time varying explanatory variables. For the
data of this study, the Piecewise exponential model is selected,
because: (a) the data includes a lot of time varying explanatory
variables so that the discrete time method is more convenient, and
(b) the dependent variable, i.e., the year of social policy adoption,
covers over one hundred years and includes larger time intervals,
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and the Piecewise exponential model can handle this sort of data
most properly (Allison, 1991). The Piecewise exponential model
can be expressed as the following equation:
log h(t) = a(t) + Px(t)

[1]

where for ai-1 < t < ai, u(t) = i
and x(t) = x(ai- 1 )
h(t): instantaneous transition rate
a
intervals of time scale
x : vector of covariate
a, Pi: unknown parameter
and the aim is to determine how the hazard rate for a social
policy adoption depends on explanatory variables. That is, we are
interested in finding how the explanatory variables influence the
hazard rate, h(t). The equation [1] indicates the log of the hazard
increases or decreases linearly with the explanatory variables, and
it also shows that the hazard rate and the variables are assumed
constant within each interval.
Statistically, the Piecewise exponential model can be done by
an exponential model that is one of the accelerated failure time
models in the BMDP program (Allison, 1991; Dixson et al., 1990).
Thus, we can also express the Piecewise exponential model as the
log of the survival time increases or decreases with the explanatory variables. In the following equation for the accelerated failure
time model, let Y represent the natural logarithm of survival time.
Then Y can be modeled as:
Y = a+fiX' + aW

[2]

where a : a constant or intercept parameter
P :vector of coefficients
X': vector of covariates
a : a scale parameter
W: a random variable with a specified distribution
In this study, the parameter estimations are carried out using
BMDP and SAS statistical programs, which calculate parameters
using the equation 12] (Dixson et al., 1990; SAS, 1988).
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The quantitative analysis using the Piecewise exponential
model will be implemented for separate periods from 1871 to 1919
and from 1920 to 1976, because many considerations suggest the
end of World War I as the critical watershed for these countries
in their political system, enfranchisement, and party system. The
first part will focus on the time period from 1871 to 1919 and
the second part will focus on the time period from 1920 to 1976,
with the purpose of examining the different effects of explanatory
variables in comparison with the first time period.
Description of Variables
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable for the present analysis is the timing
of the adoption of the five types of social policy. Since this study
is interested in the rate at which the five categories of social
insurance programs were adopted, the actual dependent variable
is the duration from the year 1871, when the first social insurance
legislation was introduced in Germany, until a certain social program was introduced. It is reasonable to begin the analysis before
or at the occurrence of a pioneering event, such as 1871.
At the same time, we cannot regard voluntary and comprehensive programs as the same types of events. In other words,
voluntary programs can be more easily adopted than comprehensive programs, because the former require less governmental
expenditure and cover fewer people. For this reason, the adoption of comprehensive social programs should be weighted. In
the present analysis, comprehensive programs are treated as two
events, while voluntary programs count as one event. For example, the adoption of a voluntary work injuries program is treated
as one event, while the adoption of a comprehensive work injuries
program is regarded as two events. Accordingly, the total number
of events (i.e., the adoption of different social policy programs)
in the twelve countries is 117.
Independent Variable
Variables of StructuralConditions For the level of industrialization, this study uses three variables: (a) GNP (GNP) per capita,
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with Gross National Product measured in 1960 US dollars and
price, (b) the percentage of the industrial workers in the labor force
(WLABO), and (c) the degree of urbanization measured as the
percentage of population in cities of 100,000 or more (URBAN).
For political development, the extension of the franchise
(FRANAGE) is used, which indicates the electorate as a percentage of the eligible age group, including the female voters if the
country granted the right to vote to women.
The extension of the franchise may have different effects on
the origin and development of social policy at the various levels
of industrialization. In other words; the historical sequencewhether industrialization preceded the extension of the franchise
or the extension of the franchise was granted before industrialization-may have different effects on the adoption of social policy.
To get at these possible relationships, this study constructed ordinal variables indicating the relative level of industrialization
and the times when universal suffrage was granted (TYPE) in the
twelve western European countries. To do this, I first combined
three variables to measure the relative level of industrialization in
these countries. Each level of indicators of GNP, the percentage
of industrial labor force, and the degree of urbanization were
divided by that of the U.K. in 1870, and the average score was
calculated for each country. Accordingly, for example, the industrialization level of 53 for Germany in 1870 means half the level
of the U.K. in the same year. Next, the number of years until
franchise was granted to over 90 percent of the enfranchised age
group was calculated from 1870 in units of decades. For example,
over 90 percent of males in the enfranchised age group had the
right to vote in 1871 in France. The U.K. reached this percentage
in 1919. Accordingly, it took 0.1 decade in France, and 4.8 decades
in the U.K. Finally, the industrialization level was divided by
that of France in 1871 when the franchise was granted to over 90
percent of males in the enfranchised age group, and these decade
years were multiplied by the relative level of industrialization to
measure the relative time of universal suffrage and the level of industrialization, simultaneously. Thus, the smaller score indicates
that universal suffrage was granted at a relatively earlier time and
at a relatively lower level of industrialization.
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Variableson BargainingPowerof Social Actors To consider the state
managers' bargaining power, a variable of regime type is used.
Flora & Alber's (1981) categorization is used to define different
political regimes among the countries between 1870 and 1919.
Flora & Alber, following von Beyme, classified countries according to whether parliamentary responsibility of government was
introduced (parliamentary) or not (constitutional-dualist monarchy). Their classification is: (a) constitutional-dualist monarchies:
Austria, Denmark until 1901,(Finland), Germany, Norway until
1884, Sweden until 1917;(b) parliamentary democracies: Belgium,
Denmark since 1901, France, Italy (?), the Netherlands, Norway
since 1884, Sweden since 1917, Switzerland, United Kingdom
(p.79). Regime type (REGIME) is a binary variable where parliamentary systemequals one, corresponding to the above classification. This variable is used only to consider the origin of social
policy before 1920.
Relating to the bargaining power of state managers, another
important variable which the state-centered theorists suggest is
state structure including: (a) the degree of bureaucracy, and (b) the
tax system (Pampel & Wiliamson, 1989; DeViney, 1983; Skocpol
& Amenta, 1986). The rationale is that the state managers with a
stronger bureaucratic structure will have the ability to implement
social policy. It is reasonable to consider government personnel
to measure the degree of bureaucratic strength because a strong
bureaucratic organization will have a relatively large public sector. In this study, the total personnel of general government in
percentage of labor force is used. The tax system is important to
state managers because the highest proportion of their expenditure depends on taxes. In this respect, the degree of centralization
and direct tax in the system is very important in determining state
managers' bargaining power. Some researchers suggest that tax
structure based primarily on direct taxes prevents social policy
adoption, because it makes it difficult to raise funds for continued
social expenditures (Pampel & Williamson, 1989; Cameron, 1978).
In this study, the percentages of centralization and direct tax
are used.
For the capitalists' bargaining power, this study constructed
one binary variable: the world economic situation (WE). The assumption for this variable is that when the world economy is in
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a downswing, the capitalist bargaining power will be weaker so
that state managers can respond to the demands of the working class which is getting stronger in this situation. Following
Goldstein's periodization of the Kondratieff wave (1985; Strang,
1990), the periods of 1872-1893 and 1917-1940 are identified as
downswings, and 1893-1917 and 1940-1967 as upswings. The
binary variable "WE" equals one in upswings and zero otherwise.
For measuring the degree of the working class bargaining
power, three variables are used: (a) the percentage of industrial
workers in the labor force, (b) the extension of the franchise, and
(c) the percentage of the vote which labor or socialist parties
received.
Tables I and 2 present descriptive statistics for these explanatory variables. The correlations between these variables reported
in table 2 allow us to explore preliminary analysis of relationships
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Independent Variables for Two
Different Time Periods
Variables
Structural
GNP
URBAN
FRANAGE
TYPE
State
REGIME
GADMIN
TAXDI
CENT
Capitalist
WE
Workers
WLABO
SOCVOTE

1871-1919
Mean
s.d.

1920-1976
Mean
s.d.

616.28
14.42
67.63
5.14

201.60
10.37
24.98
3.67

1111.42
21.26
75.59
5.00

.36
.66
45.72
67.15

.48
.33
10.44
12.62

1.08
52.52
75.41

.58
10.50
13.88

.63

.49

.48

.50

30.61
11.62

9.15
11.24

36.43
32.87

8.02
10.87

371.85
8.60
21.63a
3.32
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between the level of industrialization and the political development. The table shows that there are very low correlations between the extension of the franchise, the percentage of vote which
socialist or labor parties received, GNP, the percentage of the industrial workers, and urbanization, particularly between the percentage of industrial workers and the extension of the franchise.
It means that an increase in the number of industrial workers did
not automatically extend the franchise nor strengthen a socialist
or labor party. This weak relationship rejects the basic assumption
of working-class-strength theory. Likewise, the low correlation
between the level of industrialization and the extension of the
franchise also rejects the assumption that industrialization automatically brings democratization.
Data Sources
The data for the analysis of western European cases are mostly
selected from Flora et al.'s book, State, Economy, and Society in
Western Europe, 1815-1975: A DataHandbook in two Volumes (1983).
The book consists of ten chapters such as National States, Mass
Democracies, Personnel of the State, Resources of the State, Welfare States, Population and Families, Urbanization and Housing,
Economic Growth, Division of Labor and Inequality, and Trade
Unions and Strikes. The introduction of a social insurance system
and its growth is a dependent variable, while urbanization, the
industrial labor force, government personnel, public expenditure
are independent variables which are selected from relevant chapters. Flora's earlier version of this book, Quantitative Historical
Sociology (1975) is used as a complement to the later work. Other
sources include Bairoch's Europe's Gross National Product: 18501975 (1976) and International Industrializationlevels from 1750 to
1980 (1982) for GNP per capita, the second and the third volumes
of Cook & Paxton's European PoliticalFacts (1978, 1981), McHale's
PoliticalPartiesof Europe (1983), and Stateman's Year-Book between
1883 and 1930.
Results of Analysis
In this study I have tried to determine: (a) whether the rate
of the adoption of the five social insurance programs depends
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on structural conditions, as suggested by the logic of industrialism or political development theory, or whether the rate also
depends on social actors' bargaining power; (b) whether or not
the different sequential developments of industrialization and
enfranchisement have an important effect on the adoption of the
five social insurance programs.
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients, their standard errors (in parentheses), and their p-values for Piecewise exponential
model of the transition rate of social policy adoption for separate
Table 3
Ms Estimates of Transition Rates of Social Policy Adoption
1871-1919 and 1920-1976a
1871-1919
Estimates (1)

p-value

1920-1976
Estimates (2)

p-value

B0
Structural
GNP
URBAN
FRANAGE
REGIME
TYPE
State
GADMIN
CENT
TAXDI
Capitalists
WE
Workers

4.7468 (1.6680)

.0044***

6.6066 (1.8707)

.0004***

-.
-.
-.
-.

.0151*
.1375
.7249
.5256
.0066**

-. 0001 (.0004)

-. 7090 (.7104)
.0254 (.0159)
-. 0272 (.0216)
.4972 (.3453)

SOCVOTE
WLABO
GLOBAL

-. 0477 (.0162)
.0549 (.0340)

CHI-SQUARE
(d)

70.5200***

Variable

*p <.05

**p < .01

0059
0558
0024
2282
.2301

(.0024)
(.0376)
(.0068)
(.3595)
(.0850)

***p <.005

aStandard errors in parentheses.

-. 0299 (.0258)

.8950
.2468

.1701 (.0691)

.0138*

.3183
.1107
.2086

-. 0590 (.5553)
-. 0020 (.0156)
-. 0107 (.0210)

.9154
.8967
.6118

.1499

-. 6922 (.2914)

.0175*

.0033***
.1071

-. 0371 (.0193)
-. 0347 (.0222)

.0543
.1185

24.8700***
9
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analyses of two time periods from 1871 to 1919 and from 1920
to 1976. The regression coefficient indicates the relative effect of
the covariate on the survival time. In interpreting the meaning of
these coefficients, special attention should be paid to their positive
or negative signs and the degree of statistical significance. The
absolute values of coefficient, however, cannot be compared directly with each other. Since BMDP and SAS statistical programs
for the exponential model estimate parameters on the basis of
the assumption that the survival time of a certain event is related
to the explanatory variables log-linearly, a positive coefficient in
table 3 indicates a positive effect on survival time. Accordingly,
a positive coefficient decreases the value of the hazard function.
A negative coefficient has the reverse interpretation, that is, it
increases the value of the hazard function and, therefore, indicates
a negative effect on survival time.
Early Social Policy Adoption from 1871 to 1919
The estimates (1) in table 3 show that structural conditions
such as the level of industrialization are significant variables. At
the same time, the different sequential developments of industrialization and enfranchisement also have a significant impact on
the time of social policy adoption. Likewise, the table reveals that
social actors' bargaining power is also an important variable in
the explanation of social policy adoption.
Consistent with the findings of the "logic of industrialism,"
the level of GNP increases the rate of social policy adoption significantly (significant at the .05 level). This result, however, should
not be interpreted comparatively, but historically. That is, the rate
of social policy adoption increased according to the growth of
GNP in a certain country, but the countries with a higher level of
GNP did not necessarily adopt social policy earlier between 1871
and 1919.
Concerning the different effects of sequential development
of industrialization and political development, however, the table shows that the estimate for TYPE is positive, indicating that
the countries in which universal male suffrage was granted at
a relatively lower level of industrialization adopted social policy programs earlier than the countries in which universal male
suffrage was granted at a higher level.
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The Level of Industrializationand Extension of Male Suffrage at the
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Figure 2 shows the correlation between the different sequential developments and the adoption of the first social insurance
program among these countries. If we exclude Germany, the other
countries can be categorized into two groups. One group including Italy, Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Norway adopted the first
social insurance system at a relatively lower level of industrialization under more limited suffrage. The other group including Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium, France, the U.K., and the
Netherlands adopted the program at a relatively higher level of
industrialization under more extended suffrage. In other words,
if we consider that in most western European countries industrialization preceded the extension of male suffrage, countries at a
lower level of industrialization could adopt a social insurance system under the less extended suffrage, while higher industrialized
countries had to wait to adopt the program until enfranchisement
was extended to more people. Furthermore, countries at a lower
level of industrialization, especially Italy, Austria, Sweden, and
Finland, adopted a social insurance system earlier than others
at a higher level of industrialization such as the U.K., Belgium,
the Netherlands, France, and Denmark. This result simply rejects
the argument of "logic of industrialism" which sees social policy adoption as a simple result of industrialization, at least in
explanation of the first social insurance adoption. Since most of
these countries had already started industrialization when they
adopted the first social insurance system, the above results, however, do not mean that industrialization is not important in the
explanation of welfare state development, but they mean that
industrialization alone is not a sufficient variable for welfare state
development. Rather, figure 2 suggests that the more important
condition is at which level of industrialization the major extension
of male suffrage was granted. Thus, the results clearly illustrate
that the democratization has different effects according to the
level of industrialization.
On the other hand, other variables related to structural conditions have no significant effects on the adoption of social policy
at the .05 level. Particularly, the extension of the franchise and
regime type do not have any significant effect on their own in the
explanation of social policy adoption.

Social Policy

23

In relation to working class bargaining power, the positive
sign of estimates for WLABO indicates that the size of the industrial sector of the labor force has a negative effect on the
rate of social policy adoption, even though it is not statistically
significant at the .05 level. On the other hand, the percentage of the
vote which labor or socialist parties receive has a positive effect
on the rate of social policy adoption, and statistically significant
at the .05 level, indicating that many social policy programs in
earlier time periods were adopted with the growth of socialist or
labor parties.
Variables concerning state-strength theory have few effects
in the first period. The negative sign of estimate for REGIME
indicates that social policy programs were adopted earlier under
constitutional-dualist political systems in which parliamentary
responsibility for government was not yet introduced, but it is
not statistically significant at the .05 level. Inconsistent with the
results of state-strength theory (DeViney 1983, 1984), the number
of general administrators and the degree of tax centralization did
not have significant effects on the rate of social policy adoption in
the first period. At the same time, tax structure operationalized
by the proportion of direct tax rate (TAXDI), and centralization
(CENT) did not have a significant effect in this period.
Finally, the estimates (1) in table 3 show that the estimate
for the world economic situation (WE) is positive, suggesting
that during world economic downswing, the rate of social policy
adoption increased, but this variable also has no significance at
the .05 level.
Late Social Policy Adoption from 1920 to 1976
For the analysis of the late period from 1919 to 1976, the
variables are generally the same as those for the early period
presented in table 3. Many social policy programs, however,
were introduced under limited suffrage in the first period, while
universal suffrage was granted in most countries before the
second period, and political systems had changed into parliamentary democracy; thus, the variables of the extension of the
franchise and regime type were deleted for the analysis of the
second period.
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The effect of the different sequential development (TYPE) is
negative on the survival time, the same as in the early period and
statistically significant at the .05 level, indicating that even in the
late period social policy programs were adopted earlier in the
countries in which universal suffrage was granted at a relatively
lower level of industrialization.
The estimates (2) in table 3 also show that the world economic
situation (WE) has significant effects at the .05 level in the late
period. That is, the rate of social policy adoption increased when
the world economy was on an upswing. Since this effect was
the reverse of that of the early period, one possible explanation
concerning the world economic situation is that under limited
suffrage, the relatively strong state managers respond to the demand of the working class when the world economy was in a
downswing, while in the late period, relatively strong capitalists
objected less when the world economy was on an upswing. Another possible explanation is that socialist or labor parties could
receive more support after W.W.ll, and that period was consistent
with the periodization of economic upswing. In this respect, the
effect of the world economic situation on social policy adoption
in the late period might be spurious due to the effect of W.W.II.
In addition, the effects of the world economic situation on each
country may be different. Therefore, the effect of the world economic situation on the development of social policy needs further
investigation in a future study.
Working class bargaining power has a contradictory effect
in this period compared with the early period. The size of the
working class in the labor force has a positive effect on the rate
of social policy adoption in the second period unlike the first
period, even though it is not statistically significant at the .05
level in both periods. At the same time, the percentage of the vote
which socialist or labor parties received is not significant at the
.05 level. But the result shows that it still has a positive effect on
the rate of social policy adoption and has a relatively significant
effect (P = .054).
A remarkable result in the second period is that the variables
concerning the level of industrialization such as the GNP, urbanization, and the size of the working class have little effect on the
survival time. Likewise, the variables concerning state-strength
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theory, such as the degree of bureaucracy and tax structure, did
not have any more significant effects on social policy adoption in
the late period than in the first period.
Discussion
In this study, I have tried to link empirical patterns in the
development of western European social policy programs to the
theoretical framework of the different sequences of historical development. The findings of event-history analysis in early and late
periods showed that the variables of the vote which the socialist
or labor parties received, and the interactive effect of industrialization and political development had commonly positive significance in both periods on the rate of social policy adoption. On
the other hand, the level of GNP had a positive effect only in the
early period, and the upswing of the world economic situation
had a positive effect only in the late period. Other variables were
not significant in either period at the level .05, but the comparison
of their p-values suggests some conclusions concerning the current theories of social policy adoption: (a) Logic of industrialism
arguments connecting the level of GNP to social policy development receive some support. The results showed that, only on a
lower level of industrialization, the rate of social policy adoption
increased with the growth of the level of GNP. (b) Working-class
strength theory also receives limited support. According to the
results, the working class can have influence on the development
of social policy only through the bargaining power of socialist or
labor parties, indicating that the interests of the working class are
not expressed on the individual level, but on the collective level
through political institutionalization. Rather, the findings suggest, the size of the working class itself has different effects in the
early and late periods-it is negative in the early adoption, while
it is positive in the late adoption. Finally, (c) the separate analyses
of the two periods also showed that state-centered arguments can
receive some support only under the condition of limited political development. The variables concerning state-strength theory
have a stronger effect in the first period, as we expected, while
they have a weaker effect in the second period, indicating that the
role of state managers in social development is more important
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under the conditions of limited political development. In sum,
separate analyses of the two periods clearly show that there are
different forces bringing about the introduction of social policy.
The survival analysis of BMDP program provides the global
chi-square (X2) statistic, which tests the hypothesis that all regression coefficients are identically zero. According to table 3,
the global chi-square scores are 70.52 and 24.87 for both models
of early and late social policy adoption, respectively, and are
statistically significant at the .005 level with 11 and 9 degrees of
freedom. It indicates that cross-sectional and temporal variation
in the measured covariates are sufficient to account for the development of social policy in both early and late periods of western
European countries.
Notes
1. Among these countries, for example, the average annual growth rates of GNP
per capita of Brazil, Mexico, India between 1965 and 1986 are 4.8%, 2.6%, and
1.8%, respectively (World Bank, 1988, pp. 222-223). But their expenditure of
social security schemes as percentages of GDP in 1983 remain 5.6% (4.3% in
1965), 2.8% (2.6% in 1965), and 1.5% (1.3% in 1965) in Brazil, Mexico, and India
(ILO, 1988).
2. In some policy domains such as road construction, of course, capital accumulation projects become self-legitimatizing. In social policy domain, however,
the higher social expenditure surely prevents capital accumulation, while it
increases the legitimacy.
3. In the basic model of working-class-strength theory, both Korpi and Shalev,
and Stephens emphasized the mobilization of working class for labor unions
and socialist parties. But they did not provide the explanation of causal link B
in Figure 1, by arguing that an increase of the numbers of workers (Stephens),
or economic forces and historical events (Korpi & Shalev) determined the mobilization of workers. In this respect, working-class-strength theory provides
structural explanation (Rothstein, 1990, p. 319).
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